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Previous Delegations And ReportsNayarit (1999) Guatemala (1999) Mexico (2000) Peru (2001) El Salvador (2003) ______________________________________________ Guatemala: Elections 1999
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APPENDIX A: |
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Structure and
Operations of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE)
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APPENDIX B: |
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On November 7, 1999, the people of Guatemala went to the
polls to select their president, congress, mayor and representatives to the
Central American Parliament. As allowed under the Guatemalan constitution,
foreigners from throughout the world were invited to participate as observers in
these watershed elections - the first country's first since the signing of the
national Peace Accords in 1996.
A Canadian delegation called "Building Bridges with Guatemala" journeyed to Guatemala to serve as electoral observers. The group was comprised of six individuals from Victoria, British Columbia and one from Kingston, Ontario. The delegation joined approximately one thousand other observers from Europe, North America, Latin America and Asia.
"Building Bridges with Guatemala" is a Victoria-based non-partisan organization comprised of volunteers who have an interest in global politics and in the development of civil and democratic societies in the region of Latin America. The group sent one previous delegation to the state of Nayarit, Mexico in July of 1999 to observe that state’s elections. The organization brings together local citizens who are interested in learning about democratic processes in other countries and in creating links with a variety of organizations. In keeping with the philosophy of the group, which is that "building bridges" across borders can be done by people of all backgrounds and experiences, there are few pre-requisites for those wishing to participate as election observers. Key qualities are flexibility, curiosity, approachability and openness, enthusiasm to learn, and patience. The previous delegation brought together, among others, a retiree from Saltspring Island, a geography student from the University of Victoria, a city councillor and provincial government employees. Each participant contributes their unique abilities and gifts, both during the election and afterward. Delegates return to their communities and share their experiences and the critical awareness that results from observing another country create a democratic society.
Steven Baileys
One
of the project co-ordinators, Steven has volunteered with a number of community
groups including the Building Bridges with Chiapas Human Rights Observer Project
and the Central American Support Committee. Steven has travelled extensively
throughout Mexico and Central America and works with the BC Human Rights
Commission.
Therese Boullard
A
Human Rights Officer with the BC Human Rights Commission, Therese has also
worked with a number of community groups including Project Literacy Victoria and
the Victoria Native Friendship Centre.
Alvaro Moreno
A
native of El Salvador, Alvaro has extensive experience working with community
development and social justice issues both in Victoria and in Central America.
Alvaro is the other project co-ordinator for the delegation
Michael Nation
A
former board member of the Victoria Inter-Cultural Association and an employee
with the Ministry of Advanced Education, Michael also worked on relief and
development projects in Africa for five years.
Paul Rovers
Paul
is a graduate of Political Science from St. Francis Xavier University in Nova
Scotia. He is a member of the local Oxfam Victoria office and is an intern with
the Vancouver Institute for the Americas – an organisation dedicated to
promoting understanding between Canada and the countries of Latin America.
Linda Shout
A
student in the Women’s Studies program at the University of Victoria, Linda
has also worked as a volunteer with the Victoria Status of Women Action Group.
She is an employee of the BC Human Rights Commission.
Godfrey Spragge
Godfrey joined the delegation after it arrived in Guatemala. Godfrey is a retired professor of Urban and Regional Planning at the University of Queens in Kingston, Ontario. He is also a former participant in Project Accompaniment, an organization that assisted with the repatriation of Guatemalan refugees from Mexico.
The delegation members were responsible for raising the funds required for air travel, accommodation and food. With the generous assistance of the Victoria Christ Church Cathedral (Anglican), a benefit dance was held that allowed the delegation to raise enough funds to cover the cost of food and accommodation while in Guatemala
The delegates organized two training workshops prior to
their departure. The workshops were designed to educate the group regarding the
roles and responsibilities of an electoral observer.
The first workshop involved a briefing session held with representatives from Elections BC – the non-partisan provincial agency responsible for organizing and conducting elections throughout the province. The delegation learned the required elements of a credible and democratic election:
· independent electoral administration
· universal suffrage
· accessible voter registration
· accessible voting locations and facilities for special voting
· easily understood voting process
· secret ballot
· transparent voting proces
Elections BC provided the group with guidelines and checklists on these key elements
The delegation held a subsequent half-day educational
workshop. With valuable assistance from Jorge and Morena (from Guatemala and El
Salvador, respectively), and based on research conducted by the delegates
themselves, the team studied Guatemala’s electoral process, the role of
foreign observers, the political parties and candidates, geography, human rights
and socio-economic conditions. The delegates also benefited considerably from
the experiences of three of its members who had served as election observers in
the state of Nayarit, Mexico.
The delegation arrived in Guatemala City one week prior to the election. During this time we met with representatives of governmental and non-governmental organizations, political parties, the Roman Catholic Church, human rights associations, and women’s and indigenous groups. These included the following:
· Mission de Las Naciones Unidas en Guatemala (MINUGUA-the United Nations Mission in Guatemala)
· Tanya Palencia, a political science Ph.D. candidate
· law students from the University of San Carlos
· Sector Mujeres (Women's Forum), a coalition of Guatemalan women’s groups
· Father Walter (last name omitted), a Roman Catholic parish priest
· Centro Internacional de Investigacion de los Derechos Humanos (CIIDH)— the International Center for the Investigation of Human Rights
· Kuchuj Voz, a non-governmental Mayan umbrella organization
· Officials from the political party Alianza Nueva Nacion (ANN), including Vitalino Similox, the Vice-presidential candidate
· Tribunal Supremo Electoral (TSE), the national electoral agency
· Dr. Julio Eduardo Arango Escobar, Procurador de Los Derechos Humanos (Ombudsman for Human Rights)
· Commision Nacional de Viudas Guatemaltecas (CONAVIGUA), the national organization of the widows and family members of those killed during the civil war.
The delegation also participated in workshops and discussions with other international delegations, including Peace Brigades International, the Canada-Guatemala Solidarity Network and Global Education. Some of these delegations were in Guatemala to observe the election, but others had broader mandates covering community development, the support of local cooperatives, and monitoring human rights.
The delegation was unsuccessful in its attempts to arrange meetings with representatives from the governing Partido de Avancada Naciónal (PAN) party and the opposition Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG) party.
Unfortunately, there were limited opportunities to observe and analyze media coverage of the political campaign. This was due partly to the fact that only three delegates spoke and understood Spanish, as well as a busy schedule that at times exceeded 16-hour days. The delegates, nevertheless, were able survey a number of national and local newspapers and magazines, and continued to read as much as possible between meetings, siestas, meals, and nightly de-briefing sessions.
One
of seven countries that comprise the region known as Central America, Guatemala
is located to the south of Mexico. Guatemala shares its north eastern border
with Belize and its eastern border with Honduras and El Salvador.
The population of Guatemala is approximately 12 million, the majority of whom are indigenous descendants of the Mayan civilization. Guatemala's indigenous population comprises a much larger percentage of its total population than any other Latin American country (estimates vary from 40% to 60%). There are at least 21 Mayan groups, each with their own distinct languages and unique customs, as well as the Caribbean coastal Garifuna people who are descendants of Carib Indians and African slaves.
According to 1995 statistics, Guatemala had a per capita income of $1,340 (US$). Approximately 57% of Guatemalans lived in poverty while 37% of that same number existed in extreme poverty. In 1988 an estimated 3% of the population owned half the farmland. At the end of the 1990’s the average life expectancy in Guatemala was just under 60 years, the lowest in Central America.[1]
The Republic of Guatemala was created in 1823. Its proclamation of independence freed the country from almost three centuries of rule by the Spanish monarchy and colonialists. Unfortunately, throughout the remainder of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th, the political and social structures of the Republic mirrored those forged during Spanish colonial rule. The majority of Guatemalans (indigenous, rural and poor) remained as marginalized as they had under Spanish rule and had limited access to the country’s political process and institutions.
However, 1944 saw the overthrow of dictator Jorge Ubico. Two democratically elected governments followed in a decade known as the “spring revolution.” This decade marked a period of relative social democracy coupled with the creation of state policies to address land reform and implement economic and social programs to benefit the poor and the indigenous.
Guatemala’s spring revolution came to an abrupt end in 1954 with a CIA-backed military coup that forced the resignation and exile of President Jacobo Arbenz. The following three decades witnessed a return to anti-democratic government and a society dominated by the military and landowning elites.
From 1954 to 1984, elected regimes alternated with military ones achieved by coups d'etat. Elections, when they were held, offered political choices limited to right wing and extreme right-wing parties. Mayan Guatemalans were largely excluded or discouraged from participating in the electoral process. The Mayans and ladinos who did vote were often coerced into voting for certain candidates. Parties from the left were either outlawed or prevented – through intimidation – from becoming real electoral alternatives.
Authoritarian political and military systems, coupled with
many severe social and economic inequities gave rise, in the early 1960’s, to
the creation of a number of left-wing armed groups. The base for these groups
swelled with support from the alienated indigenous communities, from campesinos
and from other Guatemalans motivated by the desire for social change. The civil
war was to last over 36 years, causing deep divisions within the country and
within communities. An estimated 200,000 Guatemalans were killed or
"disappeared" during this time
Popular political organizations, disillusioned with the electoral process, discouraged their supporters from participating in elections. Voter abstention was high, and political choices limited. Practices such as vote buying, intimidation and ballot box stuffing further eroded the credibility of the electoral process. Efforts at moderation by some presidents were offset by the army's consolidation of its influence across a wide range of business and commercial interests.
By the early 1980's, the restrictive elements of Guatemala’s political process limited participation to parties with bases of support in the army, business, landowners or conservative religious groups. Politics and political parties were formed around individual personalities. Electoral law did little to encourage the formulation of political platforms.
In August of 1983 Guatemala started on the long road towards establishing a civilian, democratic society. Pressure from the US government caused the Guatemalan military to yield its control of the government and allow a more “democratic” regime. The Guatemalan Constitutional Assembly drafted a new constitution built around a “peace and reconstruction” theme. To ensure electoral impartiality, the TSE (Supreme Electoral Tribunal) was created to administer and oversee the electoral process with a minimum of government interference.
In 1985, the victory of civilian president Vinicio Cerezo created much-needed "breathing space" for Guatemala’s budding civilian and popular organizations, many of whose leaders and members had been persecuted, exiled or killed during the previous two and a half decades. Although the military and landowning elite retained covert control of the nation's institutions, the general thaw in Guatemala’s political climate had begun, allowing for the formation and growth of civil organizations that could push for genuine and meaningful social reforms.
In 1986, peace negotiations to end the country’s civil war began between Cerezo’s government and the country’s left-wing guerrilla groups, leading to changes to the country’s electoral process. Article 223 of the new constitution allowed for the establishment and existence of political parties from across the political spectrum, including parties with links to communist or socialist ideologies.
The elections of 1990 brought increased hope as Guatemala
experienced its first peaceful transfer of civilian power in more than three
decades. Unfortunately, the continuing lack of trust in the electoral process
saw only 33 percent of registered voters turn out to the polls. Government
policy continued to be dominated by an alliance of the army, big business and
landowners, and the country still faced severe socio-economic problems.
In the most recent elections of 1995, the PAN, under candidate Alvaro Arzú, assumed the presidency and control of congress. Arzú had survived a close second round vote over the FRG and its charismatic candidate, Alfonso Portillo. Arzú’s victory, however, was tainted with accusations of fraud. During the vote count the nation’s power supply failed, causing the vote counting computers of the TSE to crash. When power was restored, the FRG, who were leading before the lights went out, found themselves in second place and staring at a 3% PAN victory.
Fewer than 37% of registered voters participated in the 1995 election. The 52% of the voters who did vote for the PAN did so thanks to backing from the agricultural, financial and professional class. The PAN’s domestic support was further bolstered by the international recognition it garnered for promising to conclude peace negotiations aimed at bringing an end to the civil war which still continued, albeit only in the remote regions of the country.
During his term in office, President Arzú faced many challenges. An ongoing civil war, much-needed land and tax reform and growing calls for Mayan self-government all posed formidable challenges for the PAN during its five-year mandate. President Arzú was astute in recognizing that foreign investment could only be attracted if the civil war was ended. In December of 1996, Arzú and the four remaining guerrilla groups signed the Peace Accords, ending 36 years of civil war.
The long hoped for Peace Accords contained provisions that:
· recognized the unique linguistic and cultural identity of indigenous citizens
· sought to eliminate centuries old patterns of systemic discrimination
· promoted the socio-economic development of all Guatemalans, and
· empowered MINUGUA to oversee a Truth Commission to investigate human rights violations.
The Peace Accords called for the militant left-wing groups to lay down their arms under a general amnesty and permitted them to establish political parties in time for the elections of 1999. The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity Party (UNRG), formerly a coalition of four guerrilla groups, and the Guatemalan National Democratic Front (FDNG), a coalition of left-of-centre parties, represented the new non-right-wing political alternatives for the country.
Seventeen political parties registered with the TSE for this election. Of this number, eleven put forward candidates for president, while all of them ran candidates for mayor and congress. In all, more than 40,000 candidates were running for office among a total of about 3,000 positions.
The three major parties heading into the election were the PAN, the FRG and the ANN.
The PAN
PAN was founded in 1989 by President Arzú, a former mayor of Guatemala City. PAN is regarded as a moderate right wing party and draws its principal support from the capital city's two and half million inhabitants. Party members primarily come from the professional and business classes and the “new right” or neo-liberals.
PAN's presidential candidate for the 1999 election, Oscar Berger, had to bear the burden of President Arzú’s declining popularity due to undelivered economic promises, an ambitious privatization program and a lack of commitment to implementing the Peace Accords. Public opinion polls in the weeks leading up to the election indicated that the PAN had 30% of popular support.
The FRG
The FRG, the principal opposition party going into these elections, was founded in 1988 by General Efraín Ríos Montt, current president of the party. Ríos Montt has a long history in Guatemalan politics. In 1982, after a military coup, he was installed as president of the country. Under his governance Guatemala experienced an unprecedented expansion of the country’s scorched earth policy and human rights abuses in the zeal to eradicate the guerrillas. Ironically, Ríos Montt was removed from the presidential seat following a military coup in 1983.
Barred by the constitution from seeking the presidency in these elections, Ríos Montt supported the candidacy of Alfonso López Portillo, a charismatic and engaging man. With a successful populist and nationalist platform that appealed to working class, urban and rural Guatemalans alike, Portillo mounted an effective and energetic electoral campaign that had the FRG ahead in the polls in the weeks leading up to the November 7th election.
The ANN presented the third strongest political force in the election. The ANN, formed in 1999, is comprised of the guerrilla groups who signed the Peace Accords and the Desarollo Integral Autentico (DIA) party, a small community development organization.
The ANN's presidential candidate was Alvaro Colom, an industrial engineer born in Guatemala City. Colom, unlike many ANN supporters and candidates, was never a member of the armed resistance[2]. He could best be described as a social democrat who has a track record of working with the poor and with indigenous communities. The ANN had about 7% of popular support heading into the election
Under Guatemala’s electoral law the president, congress and mayors are elected for four-year terms in the following manner:
The president can serve one term only, and is prohibited from seeking re-election. A candidate must receive a minimum of 50% of the vote during the first round. If no candidate receives at least 50% during the first round, a second round of voting is held between the top two candidates. In this case, the second round of voting, if required, was scheduled for December 26, 1999.
Guatemala has a unicameral congress (no senate). The 113 members of congress who represent the country’s 22 departments are elected by a combination of direct majority vote (91 seats) and proportional representation (21 seats) based on the percentage of national vote garnered by each party.
Mayors are elected directly by majority vote in each of the country’s 330 municipalities. Council members are elected as part of a slate pre-selected by the mayoral candidat
The fair conduct of voter registration, voter education and party campaigning is a significant contributor to a free and transparent election process. Fair access to the media also plays a role. Unfortunately, our arrival in Guatemala only seven days before the election meant that we were unable to observe most of these activities. The information below is gathered from a number of sources, predominantly from the meetings we held with the Guatemalan organizations and individuals listed earlier in this report.
In order to vote in Guatemala voters must:
· be 18 years of age or older
· be a Guatemalan citizen
· have obtained a cedula, or Guatemalan identity card
· register in the municipality where they live
· be listed on the padrón (voter’s list) on election day.
Under Article 15 of the country’s electoral law the following are prohibited from registering to vote:
· active members of the Army
· active members of the security forces, e.g., the police
· those whose rights of expression have been suspended, e.g., convicted criminals
· those who have lost their Guatemalan citizenship.
The TSE stated that 4,458,744 Guatemalans had registered for this election. They provided two breakdowns pertaining to gender and literacy:
· 1,900,631 women and 2,448,131 men
· 3,082,231 literate voters and 1,376,531 illiterate voters.
It is worth noting that an estimated 25% of the voting-age population, or approximately one million Guatemalans, either were unable to or declined to register for these elections.
Voter registration was held for the most part in urban centres. To increase registration and voter participation in rural areas, the TSE sent mobile registration units into normally inaccessible and isolated communities. However, some groups criticized the use of the mobile registration units because the units traveled to these villages with officials who often spoke only Spanish and used educational materials in the same language. It was said that the limited number of mobile units and the language limitations rendered this effort at voter education largely ineffective. Potential voters that lived in villages not visited by the units had to travel long distances to the nearest urban centre to register and then to vote.
The deadline for voter registration was August 7, 1999, three months before the election. Anyone wanting to register after that date was unable to. In Guatemala, there is no proxy or absentee voting. For example, a voter cannot vote at an embassy or consulate in another country.
When a voter registers, he or she must register in the community listed on their cedula. If a voter registers and votes outside of their resident community they are permitted to vote only at the national level. In order to vote at the local level, a voter must return to his or her community for registration, and return again on election day
During the delegation’s meeting with Vitalino Similox (the vice-presidential candidate for the ANN) it was emphasized that although literate women were granted suffrage in 1945, universal suffrage was not granted until 1965. Only recently had women and illiterate citizens been encouraged to participate in the voting process. Similox also stated that approximately 180 female candidates were running for congress on the national and departmental lists, for the Central American Parliament and for municipal mayorships. Two female candidates were running as candidates for president and a further two female candidates for vice-president.
Kuchuj Voz, the voter education organization for indigenous communities, stated that although the indigenous people comprise more than half the country’s population, they do not have equal or proportional access to the country’s social and political institutions. This marginalization is worsened by:
· cultural limitations which inhibit the participation of indigenous women
· language – many Mayans do not speak Spanish as their first language but the language of most election materials is Spanish
· limited access to education – both education in general and voter education in particular.
In an effort to address the historic high rates of abstention during elections, the TSE undertook a number of initiatives to encourage greater registration and voter participation. Examples of this included an increase in the number of polling stations, particularly in rural communities, and an aggressive voter education campaign. The Executive Director of the TSE announced there would be 7,600 voting tables located throughout the country’s 330 municipalities. Each voting table at a polling station has 600 registered voters on its electoral list. Polling stations can have up to 100 voting tables.
The TSE also encouraged citizens to participate in the electoral process with a variety of education and media strategies. Guatemalans were urged to register and vote with slogans such as “Your vote is valuable” and “It’s your election.” Voter information centers (TSE-linked computers listing information about polling station locations) were set up in various sites such as an upscale shopping mall attached to the Hyatt Hotel in Guatemala City.
We saw very little evidence explaining the registration process by the TSE. This information appeared to be provided primarily by political party activists. In addition, MINUGUA reported that the TSE focussed its resources in urban centres because of the perception that rural citizens "don't vote anyway."
In addition to the voter education programs carried out by the TSE and the larger political parties, a number of civilian organizations such as Kuchuj Voz and the Sector Mujeres carried out very effective voter education and registration campaigns within their respective communities.
Access to the media by all political parties is key to the building of a democratic society. The delegation was informed that the country’s two largest newspapers, Siglo XXI and the Prensa Libre, were owned by backers of the PAN and FRG respectively. Not surprisingly, we were told that these papers tended to provide preferential coverage of these parties, while limiting campaign coverage and information of the others. We were also told that indigenous groups had difficulty even in buying advertising space or time in a number of the country’s mainstream media.
Our delegation's first night in Guatemala City provided us with our first glimpse of political advertising. The city was festooned with party posters, and we drove past a crowded and noisy political rally. Posters were plastered on lamp posts and banners were draped across the streets. A number of parties, not just the top three, tried to persuade voters with these eye-catching displays.
Although prohibited by the electoral law, a number of political parties painted their logos on hillsides as a cheap alternative to get their message out to the voters. In another example of “alternative media,” we observed that a bridge near Lake Atitlán was covered with painted ‘election’ messages. We do not recall seeing specific examples of party markings on buildings or monuments, though many enclosed areas of residences, schools and other buildings were marked.
In addition to prohibitions on advertising in a logistical
or physical sense, the electoral law stipulates other limitations: campaign
advertisements or signs cannot be morally offensive, cannot defile private
property, nor “disturb the public order.”
Election campaigning may begin the day after the call for elections, and can continue until 36 hours before election day – that is, until 1200 hours (noon) on Friday, November 5. Infractions of this part of the electoral law are subject to sanctions.
In the capital, the campaigning that we observed did cease within a few minutes of the noon deadline. Additional posters were being put up in the last five minutes, and an ANN car rally pulled up at Guatemala City’s Parque Central just before noon, and peacefully disperse
Kuchuj Voz received reports from all over the country of complaints, or denunciations, about the electoral practices of individuals or parties. Although our delegation did not observe these activities directly, Kuchuj reported that they centered mainly on buying votes, gift-giving and reports of smear campaigns. For example, 33 denunciations were received from the region of Quetzaltepeque of the PAN giving out gifts. In Ipala, 38 denunciations reported campaign irregularities on the part of the FRG. Similar denunciations came in from Palapa, San Juan Tecuaco, Coatepeque, and Jocotàn reporting questionable activities of the PAN and FRG in about equal numbers.
It had been reported earlier in the campaign that the FRG had given tools to some voters in exchange for their votes. There was also a report that pre-marked ballots were being circulated amongst voters in at least one rural community. Other activities reported included:
· offering transportation to polls if the voter would vote a particular way
· threats of retaliation for “wrong” votes
· post-dated cheques issued to voters on the condition that they vote for a specific candidate (i.e., if the voter voted properly and the candidate was elected, then the cheque would be "good")
· voters being told that "the computers" would be able to record who they were voting for, meaning that the information could become public knowledge or could be found out by an interested party
· promise of public works being completed depending upon a certain outcome
· the "dead" vote – people using the cedula of a deceased relative or friend to register a second time.
The TSE has developed a mechanism for receiving and judging denunciations. Denunciations are presented to Justices of the Peace and to the Inspector General of the TSE for judgment. The campaign denunciations gathered by Kuchuj Voz were sent to the TSE for response. As of one week before the election, the TSE had not responded to these denunciations. It is not known if the TSE followed up after the electio
We were informed that there has been some accountability of elected governments or individual members in the past, but not much. The 1999 elections were unique in Guatemalan electoral history in that parties were encouraged to create a party platform and have an open process to select candidates and the party leadership. The addition of the platform in campaigning has been credited to the work of social justice groups that have emerged since the signing of the Peace Accords. Nevertheless, in spite of these improvements, Kuchuj and the Sector Mujeres stated that there was little accountability regarding indigenous issues, women’s issues or social themes. To promote a peaceful electoral campaign, all parties and their candidates were asked to sign a "Code of Conduct" in which the parties promised to respect one another and not engage in campaign tactics that could incite violence or fraud. A number of civil groups initiated a permanent monitoring system of the parties for their respective agendas.
The presence of international (and national) observers helps to promote and protect the fairness, "honesty" and openness of the electoral process. During our meeting with the TSE, the delegation was briefed on the role and legal status of election observers. Observers are allowed to receive information from other observers and citizens. They may gather and systematize all information in the form of a report that is submitted to the TSE and other interested parties within and outside of the country. They may also receive information on the election and the electoral process from the TSE, Departmental and Municipal Boards and the local Voting Boards. International observers have access to polling stations and can be present during ballot counting. They may enter the counting centers that transmit the results of the vote counting
For these elections the TSE accredited approximately 1,000 international observers, compared with 500 and 300 for the 1995 and 1990 elections, respectively.
International observers are required to:
· respect Guatemala's constitution, its electoral processes, government institutions, political parties and candidates, and its non-governmental organizations
· behave in an open and transparent manner
· speak and act impartially, refraining from expressing opinions regarding any political party, candidate or platform.
International observers must not:
· interfere with electoral authorities
· verbalize or demonstrate support for any party or candidate
· express offensive or defaming opinions about any institution, party or candidate
· declare the victory of a party or candidate
On election day—Sunday, November 7—the delegation split into three teams in order to observe as many polling stations and election day events as possible. Team A (Paul and Theresa) and Team B (Godfrey, Alvaro and Michael) spent the day in the Distrito Central (Guatemala City and environs), visiting 12 stations in the northeast, center and east of the city. Team C (Linda and Steve) travelled by taxi to the small town of Sumpango, an hour west of Guatemala City, in order to observe a more "rural" setting.
According to Elections BC there are common factors inherent
in all transparent and fair elections. These
include considerations of who is running the election, accessibility to voting
and to voting facilities, secrecy of the ballot, atmosphere at the polling
station, the voting process itself, and the counting of the ballots.
Ideally, an election should be managed by a non-partisan agency, and one that is not interfered with by government or the ruling party. The appointment of voting officials should be carried out neutrally.
Based on what we observed, and according to what was reported to us in various discussions, we observed that the TSE was the body in fact conducting the election, not the government or the ruling party.
The TSE appoints a coordinator and a small number of junior
officials for each polling station. The way they are selected might favour one
segment of society more than another. This could bias the process to some
extent. For example, the local TSE officials appoint a president for each voting
table. The president then appoints
a secretary, a vocal, and an alguacil
(loosely translated as “sergeant-at-arms”) for the table, chosen from
amongst the president's friends and co-workers. There are loose criteria, such
as a certain level of literacy and education, but there is no formal selection
process. Potentially having only one segment of society represented as authority
figures could discourage many voters. However, we could not see, nor did we hear
of, any direct influence on this process by the government, by political parties
or by the country’s other powerful elites.
In the city, it was observed that most polling station officials were dominated by young, well-educated ladinos (non-indigenous Guatemalans). There was good gender representation at these polling stations. In contrast, table officials and fiscales in Sumpango were primarily male and ladino. There were two women wearing indigenous dress. This was not reflective of the general population accessing the voting centres, many of who were indigenous women and men from surrounding villages.
A fair election is one in which the maximum number of voters can cast their ballots freely. Accessibility to voting considers the location of polling stations, voting times, and polling station layout.
The night before election day, rainstorms in three areas of the country washed out some roads, preventing people from reaching polling stations.
Because registration numbers (and therefore voting center number) did not appear to be assigned based on place of residence—at least in the distrito central —we did not observe that voting conditions differed from more affluent zones to poorer ones. Team B went to voting center #34, the most northeasterly in the capital, specifically because it was in a lower-class neighbourhood that had experienced problems during previous elections. While entering and leaving the station we noticed many Mercedes, 4-wheel drives, and other expensive vehicles parked beside the road. These cars and trucks belonged to voters inside the polling station. Team A saw the same thing in stations #9 and #2 in zone 5 on the eastern edge of the city. It is interesting to note that, in zones 10 and 12, the two affluent residential areas near the airport in the south of the city, there were no polling stations.
Theresa talked with one family, all sharing the same Guatemala City address, in which the father, mother, and a mature child were each registered to vote at different stations in different zones of the city.
Team A observed much confusion at the polling stations, with voters trying to figure out where they had to vote. In urban areas, newspapers had published inserts listing voting station addresses and the ranges of registration numbers associated with each voting table. Some stations had these inserts taped up on the walls near the entrance for people to consult. From these, the voter could determine at which polling station and which table he or she was to cast their ballots. Each urban polling station also had a computerized information booth. Throughout the day, there were lineups of voters who had come to the wrong polling station. One information desk had a 40-minute lineup for most of the day.
There were no computerized information facilities in the village of Sumpango. When the two voting stations became very busy a few alguaciles decided to stand at the main entrances, examine voters' papers and direct them to the appropriate table. This system worked very well and helped to keep confusion to a minimum.
The coordinators, their deputies, the alguaciles and other poll officials, and even many voters themselves were helpful to people who were confused or unsure.
Polling stations were situated in enclosed locations to enable the alguaciles to close and lock the main doors or gates at the close of voting hours or in the case of a disturbance. The voting stations occupied schools, church halls, government and other public buildings such as libraries or cultural centers.
The basic design of the stations we visited was often very good for the purpose of voting. Usually there would be a central courtyard for voter lineups, with voting tables protected by roofs in the event of poor weather. In schools of more modern design, tables were often located inside classrooms, and voters waited in the corridors.
In Guatemala City, extra toilet facilities were provided,
and generators would have provided electricity for lights and computers in the
case of a power outage. This was a
real concern to voters and voting officials given the suspicious power outage
that occurred in the 1995 elections. In
Sumpango, the facilities were not so plentiful, and the only preparation for
power outages consisted of the provision of extra flashlights. However, this is
in keeping with the normal differences between urban and rural centres. The TSE
had also contracted with a small number of vendors to sell hot and cold drinks,
sandwiches and cookies to voters (provided to the voting officials for free)
during the long day, both in the City and Sumpango.
Secrecy, or the lack of it, when marking ballots was usually a function of how crowded a polling station was, or the physical design of the facility. But occasionally, the placement of the voting booths themselves was problematic. Either they were positioned too close to the lineups of voters waiting to receive their ballots, or there were too few booths to handle quickly the number of voters in the area. The crowding meant some loss of privacy while marking ballots.
Some table officials chose not to pre-fold the ballots–voters folded the ballots after they were marked. In some cases, this prevented ballots from being cleanly inserted in the ballot bag slots, and could have exposed the ballot to the view of others. Also, a ballot put in the wrong bag was retrieved by a polling station official (the “seal” of the bag was broken) and put in the correct bag, in full view of the other officials and the voter. At another table, the secretary read voters' names out loud to confirm their voter ID number, which could have been seen as a lack of privacy for those voters (historically, even the act of being seen voting could be dangerous).
However, we saw no conscious attempts to determine which
party or candidate was being voted for. We
also didn't see any people conducting exit polls.
A voting process is transparent if all ballots—except when being marked in private by voters—remain in view of officials and party representatives, from the beginning of the day when the blank ballots are counted, to the reconciliation of all used and unused ballots at the end of the day. All concerned people, such as party representatives and voting officials, should be aware of the voting process and be invited to monitor it, from poll opening to ballot counting.
All voting tables had the presence of representatives from the major parties – the PAN, FRG, and to a lesser extent the ANN – as fiscales (scrutineers). The smaller parties, which lacked the volunteer base to staff all tables, joined forces to cover more tables. The fiscales monitored the electoral process, sometimes assisting voting officials or directing voters. The fiscales were also permitted to comment on the validity of marked ballots during the counting process.
Once all ballots were counted, and once the president of the table had filled out the forms with the vote tallies, copies of these forms were provided to the fiscales. In theory, if a party such as the FRG or PAN had a fiscal at each voting table across the country, that party could verify the final TSE count against their forms to ensure that there was no fraud once the ballots left the table to be transported to the TSE offices.
None of our teams observed any attempts to intentionally subvert or abuse the voting process on election day. There were incidents that we ascribed to the inexperience of voters or officials, rather than conscious deceit or subversion.
The atmosphere at the 14 stations we observed varied between calm, orderly and almost festive at times. We were informed that the TSE had hired marimba bands for 32 of the 47 polling stations in the Distrito Central. In Sumpango, the sometimes-long lineups at voting tables were made cheerful with people swapping jokes and stories as they waited to vote.
The presence of many children with their parents created a family atmosphere. Table or station officials were generally very helpful, if occasionally unorganized.
No weapons of any type, including knives, are allowed into a voting station. In addition, all active military personnel are confined to barracks on voting day. One man armed with a shotgun and protective vest was seen inside a polling station. This person appeared to be the bodyguard of a man who entered to vote. The bodyguard left with the voter within a couple of minutes of being noticed.
Two or three police officers were usually stationed outside the entrance of each voting center, but their presence was not menacing. Some were unarmed, but most had sidearms on their belts.
Much of police activity around voting stations was for
traffic control. The geography of
Guatemala City (hills, ravines, plateaus) and the locations of voting centers
created significant traffic jams in some zones we visited.
We met or saw other observers, both national and international, in the majority of the polling stations we visited. The organizations we identified were Kuchuj Voz, the PDH, the OAS (Organization of American States), Guatemalan universities, the EUO (European Union of Observers), Peace Brigades International, Project Accompaniment, and the United Nations.
We learned from our meetings that many international organizations sent small teams of international observers across the country one or two days before the election, in order to be present in locations where violence, fraud, or some serious electoral impropriety had occurred in the past.
ThePDH has the authority to monitor the work of the TSE, and to open and investigate cases against individuals who are suspected of having committed abuses in the process of the campaign. We were informed that the PDH would have a presence in all polling places, and that its volunteers had been trained to field complaints and to mediate any disputes on the spot if necessary.
We noticed no campaign signs or posters inside any of the 14 polling stations our teams observed. We saw at least one party T-shirt worn inside a station, by a boy, and a family wearing small FRG pins.
While political parties were allowed to have fiscales at each voting table, these party members only wore a nametag. There were no visible signs of which party they belonged to. Interestingly, in Sumpango the party officials were sometimes reluctant to identify which party they belonged to when asked by Team C. This may have been due to suspicions about our role or a concern about identifying their political allegiance, especially to their neighbors.
The basic steps of the voting process are described in Appendix B.
Although there were information tables in many of the polling stations to direct voters to the correct voting table, we did not see any posters or materials with either illustrated or written instructions explaining the voting steps or how to mark ballots. In general, however, we thought the environment was a helpful one, and that there was enough willing assistance available.
Some officials knew their roles and the voting protocol better than others did. The number of voting stations and tables throughout the country was increased for this election. As a result, we expected that some first-time officials would not be perfectly familiar with their duties. We did notice that, at some tables, officials were not wearing their identifying armbands. Sometimes poll officials and non-poll officials took on roles that went beyond their legal function. For example, we observed party representatives (fiscales) acting as table officials–in one case, the FRG fiscal was acting as a table's president. In addition, one national observer was seen working as an official at a voting table.
Team C observed that a few voters had problems with their cedulas or with some other registration papers. According to the electoral law, citizens whose documents are not in order may be prohibited from voting. But in the cases Team C observed, the TSE officials at the station solved the problem and allowed the voters to cast their ballots.
Inking of the index finger was an important fraud prevention strategy imposed by the electoral laws to prevent multiple voting. However, one voter was observed removing the ink from her finger with some kind of thinner in front of the table officials, none of whom said anything.
Finally, at one station, at the conclusion of the voting day, the table president added the names of officials to the bottom of the voters' list, and the officials were then permitted to vote.
Once the polling station has closed officials can start counting their ballots. All unused ballots are stamped "unused." The ballots are counted in the presence of fiscales and observers. Ballots can be rejected if the marking does not clearly show the voter's intention and there is general agreement from the fiscales and officials.
According to TSE documentation, ballots had to be reconciled: all ballots, used and unused, had to total 600 per voting table at the end of the day. The president of the table had several forms to fill out, some to record how many votes each party or candidate received, and some to reconcile the ballots.
In Guatemala City we observed that the number of used ballots—including blanks (unmarked) and null (improperly marked) ballots—taken from the voting bags, and the number of unused ballots, did not always reconcile. For example, 600 ballots for each of the five positions being voted for were given to each table (this number was supposed to be confirmed by the table officials before the station opened at the start of the day). If, at the end of the day, 450 people had signed or marked the voter registration list, there should have been 150 unused ballots of each type left and 450 ballots in each ballot bag. In most cases, at least up until our observer teams left the polling station at around 2100 or 2130 hours, this reconciliation was not perfectly done. There was usually a difference of 5 votes or less. Sometimes the voting table officials did not count the unused ballots–they simply counted the used ballots and deducted this number from 600 to arrive at the ‘unused’ ballot number. At one polling station, Team A noticed that the officials were forced, later, to reconcile the numbers in order to send an accurate ballot count to the national tabulation center.
The fiscales at each voting table are the only people who can reject ballots. During the counts that we witnessed only a handful of ballots were rejected, and none of these rejections was disputed. We did notice, however, that at some voting stations fiscales participated fully in the closing of the voting table and ballot counting. This was an activity that went beyond their role as observer. Also, two boxes of ballots (both used and unused) were left, after counting, by the main entry to a polling station, leaving them vulnerable to tampering.
The turnout was uniformly around 55% at the tables where we stayed to watch the count. The national average was at the same level. This was the highest voter turnout since 1990, when voter turnout was 56%. During our meetings with local groups, we were told to expect low voter turnout due to a variety of factors such as voter apathy, fear, and accessibility issues. Over the course of the day, many voting table officials pointed out their tabulation of used ballots to demonstrate voter turnout, with obvious pride and enthusiasm. At one voting station in Guatemala City, a large chart was posted near the entrance with hourly updates on voter turnout.
The TSE had hoped to announce the vote results within hours of the closing of the polls. However, late-arriving results from the countryside, inclement weather in parts of the country and disturbances on the part of some voters in the rural areas slowed the tabulation of votes.
At six o’clock on the morning of Monday November 8th, a full twelve hours after the polls had closed, the first meaningful results of the elections were announced. From its headquarters at the Hyatt Hotel, where hundreds of tired and anxious Guatemalans had gathered, the TSE’s ten magistrates announced that due to slow vote counts in the rural areas only 78% of the ballots had been tabulated. Nevertheless, the preliminary outcome was clear and decisive. The FRG had captured nearly 48% of the popular vote. In second place was the PAN with approximately 30%, while the ANN garnered 12%.
The FRG’s victory gave it undisputed control of the nation’s congress along with a majority of the country’s municipalities. Presidential candidate Portillo, while just shy of the minimum 50% of votes needed to win the presidency outright, emerged well positioned for the December 26th second round presidential run-off.
The PAN’s second place result of 30% reflected results predicted by pre-election polls in the weeks leading up to the election. The PAN managed to hold on to the coveted mayoralty of Guatemala City, but saw their presence in congress reduced to 37 seats compared to the 64 seats controlled by the FRG. Presidential candidate Berger’s second-place finish of 30% assured him a second-round run-off against Portillo on December 26th.
Confounding pre-election polls, the ANN, with 12% of the vote, emerged as the country’s third strongest political force. Voters provided the ANN with 10 seats in the new congress and a handful of mayoralties, primarily in rural areas.
The fourth place party, the Partido Libertador Progresista (PLP), managed to earn 3% of the vote, which translated into one congressional seat. The Union Democratica-La Organizacion Verde (UD-LOV, the Green Party) was the fifth and final party to retain “official party status” with a single seat in congress.
In order to be eligible for state funds, a party must obtain a minimum of 4% of the popular vote or win at least one deputy seat. The election resulted in 6 parties losing their official party status.
The vote breakdown for each of the major parties and candidates was as follows:
|
Party |
Candidate |
Votes |
%
Total Vote |
|
FRG |
Alfonso Portillo |
1,023,835 |
47.82 |
|
PAN |
Oscar Berger |
648,899 |
30.31 |
|
ANN |
Alvaro Colom |
263,743 |
12.32 |
|
PLP |
Asisclo Molina |
66,297 |
3.09 |
|
Seven other parties none of which received more than 2% of the vote |
|
|
|
|
Null/Blank |
|
201,247 |
8.50 |
|
Party |
Seats
Won |
|
FRG |
64 |
|
PAN |
37 |
|
ANN |
10 |
|
UD-LOV |
1 |
|
PLP |
1 |
|
Party |
Mayoral
Seats Won |
|
FRG |
147 |
|
PAN |
106 |
|
ANN |
12 |
|
DCG (Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca) |
10 |
|
FDNG (Frente Democratico Naciónal Guatemalteca) |
5 |
|
UD-LOV |
4 |
|
PLP |
4 |
|
ARDE (Accion Reconciliadora Democratica) |
4 |
|
UCN (Union del Centro Naciónal) |
3 |
|
Civic Committees |
25 |
Guatemala
has a well-documented history of electoral fraud and pre-and post-election
violence. With the presence of international observers, Guatemalans were hopeful
that this election would be conducted in an atmosphere free of intimidation and
violence.
Reports
of violence during actual voting hours were minimal. However, in the hours
following the closing of the polls, a number of violent incidents were reported
in approximately 17 municipalities. These included the following:
·
in a number of
towns, supporters of the second-place FRG candidate attacked polling stations,
burned ballot boxes and threatened poll officials
·
in four rural
towns, FRG supporters attacked the homes of the mayor-elect PAN candidates. In
one case, the mayor-elect resigned, citing fears for the safety of his family
·
in the town of
Chisec, an estimated 3,000 voters, frustrated by slow-working poll officials and
having to wait hours in the rain for the results, threw rocks at the windows of
the voting station. Reserve police were called in to restore order
·
FRG supporters
occupied the town hall of San Marcos after learning that the PAN candidate had
been declared mayor
·
in the town of
Chiquimula, displeased voters took to the streets where they burned tires and
occupied the town hall
·
in the town of
Santa Lucia Cotzumalguapa, the FRG mayor-elect received death threats, forcing
him to go into hiding
The
majority of the reports of post-election violence and protests appeared to
involve FRG supporters who were frustrated with the narrow victories of PAN
candidates. A small number of arrests were reported but, on the whole, efforts
on the part of police were limited to restoring peace to these areas. Many
commentators believed that the post-electoral violence was the worst since 1985.
As of February 16, there were still four mayors in the municipalities of
Huehuetanango that had yet to take office. Three of the four municipalities had
been heavily vandalized and/or burned, while the ex-mayor for the fourth simply
refused to turn over the keys and the office equipment.
Reports
of election day fraud were also alleged against PAN supporters in the mayoralty
contests of the two largest cities of Guatemala and Quetzaltenango. These
allegations ranged from vote buying on the part of the PAN to intentionally
suspending public bus service on voting day in areas of Guatemala City where FRG
support was strongest. The complaint of the “parked buses” was immediately
investigated by TSE and MINUGUA. The findings of the investigation subsequently
cleared the PAN of any wrongdoing.
In accordance with the electoral law of Guatemala, the two presidential candidates who received the most votes in the November 7th vote went before the voters for a run-off election on December 26th.
The Building Bridges delegation was not present to observe the second round vote or the results. The following is a summary of the results provided by the Guatemalan media.
The TSE, mindful of its delay in announcing the November 7th vote, held a final press conference at 12:30am, over 6 hours after the polls closed to announce that FRG candidate Alfonso Portillo with 1,171,571 votes (approximately 68%) was elected president of Guatemala. Portillo defeated PAN candidate Oscar Berger, who garnered 543, 974 votes, or approximately 32% of the vote.
Approximately 41% of registered voters turned out for the second round vote, significantly fewer than the 54% who participated in the November 7th balloting. Nearly 59% of registered voters abstained from casting their ballot.
The TSE’s president, Félix Castillo Milla, announced to Guatemalans that the electoral process for these elections was a “success.”
In a post-election press conference, the EUO announced that the second round elections were “free and fair and carried out in a transparent manner which expresses the will of the people.” However, the coordinator of the EUO mission, Eeva-Liisa Myllymaki, announced a number of recommendations aimed at “increasing voter access and participation and eliminating barriers to the full-participation of Guatemalan society.” These recommendations included undertaking key revisions in the country’s Electoral Act in order to increase registration access and increase the number of voting station locations to allow greater voter access.[4]
The
TSE is the ultimate electoral authority in Guatemala. Any complaints of fraud,
irregularities or anomalies before, during or after voting day are to be
reported to and investigated by the TSE. During the November 7th
elections a number of complaints were filed with the TSE. FRG party
representatives reported a number of post-election complaints alleging fraud
against officials from the PAN. These allegations were investigated, but the
outcomes were indecisive. In spite of the allegations made, the overall
conclusion reached by the TSE confirmed that the elections reflected the will of
the majority of voters.
In
addition to the conclusion reached by the TSE, a number of Guatemalan
non-governmental civil organizations upheld the validity of the elections and
the outcome. Most national observers praised the fact that the election was
supported with a 54% voter turnout. The
country’s trend of increasing abstentionism had been reversed, thus giving
credibility to an electoral process that in previous elections had been shunned
by the majority of voters. The comments and observations made by these
representatives included:
Efraín Medina (Dean
of the University of San Carlos)
“Independent of who won the election, most important is that the legitimacy of the vote can be counted on. I believe that the response of the people should be analyzed by the principal organizations, and today it has been demonstrated that when a change is needed, one can vote for it.”
Ronalth Ocheata
(Inter-American Institute of Human Rights)
“The result was expected, and, in agreement with the findings of observers…the greater the participation the greater the likelihood that the FRG would win.”
Manfredo Marroquin
(Director of Accion Ciudadana-Citizen
Action)
“The fact is that the people have turned out at the polls and this indicates that they are motivated to look for change, and believe that their vote can make a difference…”
Edy Armas (Asamblea
de la Sociedad Civil-Assembly of
Civil Society)
“In
this country there is little left of historical memory. It has all been erased
by the propaganda which has given us this result (the FRG victory). I believe we
must reform the Electoral Law and the Law of Political Parties….The result of
the elections must be respected because it is the expressed will of the people.
However, before the election there were a number of inconsistencies with a
number of candidates that are being questioned, but for now the elections are
concluded and we must respect them and call for reason.”
Doña Petrona, one of our hosts at the hotel where the delegation stayed, spoke to us regarding the outcome of the election. Like every Guatemalan we spoke with, Doña Petrona has a very personal connection to the political violence that has plagued her country – her husband was a victim of that violence a number of years ago. In her opinion, it is too soon for the left to win – they don't yet have the experience to govern well. "Struggle takes a long time," she said. "You can't go too quickly. This was one step on the road to real democracy."
The Ombudsman for Human Rights stated that he believed the electoral process to be “going well.” There had been some verbal violence, but this was “normal.” In previous elections there had been many more people killed up to that point in the campaign. He felt that the registration process had been “cleaned up very much” by the TSE, and that there is now some trust in the system.
In spite of the incidents and allegations of violence and fraud outlined above, the EUO and the OAS concluded that the election results were lawful. In a post-election press conference representatives of the OAS and the EUO noted that the elections were “transparent…with an atmosphere that was peaceful with a high level of participation and effective organization of the voting procedure”. The OAS and EUO also stated that their representatives observed a number of polling stations throughout the country and conducted interviews with both voters and polling station officials. Both organizations were satisfied that the election did not “demonstrate any significant incidents or violations of the secret ballot.” However, concerns were noted by the OAS and the EUO that included criticism of the logistical limitations such as voter access to polling stations in rural areas and voter registration.[5]
The delegation recognizes that this election marked an improvement over the last two elections of 1990 and 1995. Specifically, the following points highlight the successes of this particular election:
· highest voter turnout since 1990
· low incidence of voting day violence
· relatively low incidence of political campaign fraud
· relatively low incidence of electoral fraud
· intimidation-free polling station atmosphere
· participation of parties of ex-combatants
· development of political platforms as part of the campaign
· increased involvement of community groups at all levels of campaigning and voting
· increased credibility of the electoral process
· record presence of local and international observers.
A number of concerns were expressed by our delegation and by the organizations and individuals we spoke with.
Campaigning
· "vote buying" via gift-giving and inappropriate use of state resources for political purposes continue to be tactics used by a number of parties
· inequities in financial resources and access to media hampered the ability of the smaller parties to campaign, advertise and distribute information
Voter registration process and voter participation
· process is less accessible to the population living in rural or remote villages and has the effect of excluding villagers who cannot, for economic reasons, take the day off to travel to an urban centre to register. Also, women may be further disadvantaged as they may not have the option to leave their families for the day
· inclement weather and travel distances prevented inhabitants of remote settlements or villages from being able to register (even mobile registration units had difficulty accessing all voters in the rural areas)
· while the use of mobile stations is a creative way of encouraging voter registration, the limited number of vehicles and the use of Spanish language voter materials and Spanish speaking staff limited the potential effectiveness of this tool
· voter registration resources were concentrated in larger population centres at the expense of the rural areas
· voter registration was not allowed after August 7th, a full three months before voting day. Voters not registered by that date were not allowed to vote
· there appeared to be a need for greater voter and civic education regarding the voting process, the electoral system and human rights
· voters had a real or perceived fear of intimidation or reprisal, particularly in the rural and remote areas of the country where voters are less sophisticated and educated
· voters continue to lack faith in the electoral process and what it has, or has not, brought them
· for refugees, the internally displaced and others such as migrant labourers, the lack of a fixed address prevented them from obtaining the necessary documentation to register and vote
Election Day issues
· voter confusion – problems in figuring out the appropriate voting table and voting station resulted in voters becoming discouraged and choosing not to vote
· ballot privacy – voting booths were sometimes placed in high traffic areas (near entries, near bathroom doors) compromising voting secrecy
· the system of choosing voting officials can result in officials not being representative of the community of voters
· election official training – inconsistencies were observed in how officials working the voting tables carried out their duties, especially when it came time to count and reconcile the ballots
· voting stations were disproportionately located in towns and cities rather than rural areas
The building of a democratic tradition takes time and requires continued refinement of the electoral process through several elections. Guatemala’s electoral history is filled with fraud and irregularities, perpetrated by both the parties and the ruling elite. The TSE is to be congratulated for the improvements it has made to date. Much work remains to be done, however. From our observations, the electoral system has been focussed on preventing fraud. However, in pursuing strategies to eliminate fraud, voter accessibility and education have been compromised. The following recommendations are made with the recognition that the efforts to prevent electoral fraud should be kept in place. These recommendations, if adopted, would continue to build on the growing trust in Guatemalan electoral process.
Campaigning
· investigate all of the denunciations reported by citizens through Kuchuj Voz and other organizations that are part of the country's budding civil society, and make public the findings
· take action to hold party officials responsible for campaign irregularities to the full extent of the electoral law
Voter Registration
· allow voters to register closer to voting day
· create voter information materials that use symbols instead of words, making them meaningful to a broader audience
· translate voter education materials into the principal Mayan languages
· increase the use and scope of the mobile registration units. In addition, use these units to distribute voter education materials and conduct voter education workshops
· it was noted during our research that several non-partisan umbrella organizations (women’s groups, indigenous groups, and student organizations) were very successful in reaching out to remote communities and encouraging voter registration and voter education. It is recommended that the TSE take advantage of these infrastructures by working with these organizations and by providing them with funding and resources to supplement the TSE voter registration efforts
Election Day
· allow voters to register and vote where they live, rather than requiring that they vote only in the community listed on their cedula. In large urban areas, when allocating voters to voting tables try to match them to the zone in which they live
· develop a system whereby absentee voters could vote by proxy
·
ensure that voters are informed of their table number and polling
station address in advance.
· increase the amount of voter information available at polling stations. It is recommended that polling stations have several voting officials who circulate amongst voters, offering assistance and direction as needed
· locate voting booths away from high traffic areas to increase voter security
· change the system of choosing voting table officials to ensure that officials are reflective of the community they serve (not simply chosen from amongst the table president's friends and coworkers)
· direct each electoral district to train the voting table officials to ensure consistency in processes, especially with the important step of ballot counting and reconciliation
· begin the process of decentralizing voting stations to include rural villages. We recognize that rural settings have historically had the highest incidence of fraud. To that end, we recommend that this decentralization be done slowly, over the next several elections
We congratulate the TSE for the progress it has made since its inception in 1983. It is our hope that international observers continue to be involved in the evolution of a more accessible, free and fair democratic electoral process.
The members of the delegation would like sincerely to thank:
· Jorge and Morena for their participation in our self-directed studies in Victoria
· Samantha Sams of the Canada-Guatemala Solidarity Network in Guatemala—whose animated spirit, depth of understanding of local politics, and great organizing ability made our lives much happier and our roles much easier
· Heather Shout, who held the fort at home and calmed our families’ anxieties
· Bob Patterson (Chief Electoral Officer) and Linda Johnson (Deputy Chief Electoral Officer) of Elections BC for their excellent workshop on democratic elections which guided our observations while we were in Guatemala
· Godfrey Spragge, for his doughty legs and spirit; his gentle, good nature; his commitment to the people of Guatemala; and his patience with the rest of the delegation
· Doña Carmen and Doña Petrona for their warm hospitality
· Peace Brigades International for allowing us the opportunity of joining in on some of their training sessions
· Father Kevin Arndt of the Christ Church Cathedral (Anglican) for his quiet assistance in making our fundraiser a huge success
· All of the individuals and groups that took time out of their busy schedules to educate and enlighten our delegation.
The Supreme Electoral Tribunal of Guatemala is an autonomous government body, and is subordinate to no other national institution. It consists of five magistrates and five alternate magistrates elected by congress for a six year term. A majority of two-thirds in the congress is required for the successful election of any candidate. Candidates for magistrate are nominated by a committee composed of the Deans of Law from the University of San Carlos and the private universities in Guatemala.
The primary functions of the Tribunal are:
· registration of citizens
· registration of candidates running for office and of the political parties
· regulation of the electoral process.
The registration of voters and regulation of the electoral process are carried out by two kinds of bodies. Citizen registries are permanent entities with headquarters in each department (state). They are responsible for registering citizens as voters, and for registering parties and individuals as candidates. Electoral boards are temporary entities created for the duration of one election only, and are responsible for overseeing the electoral process at the departmental, municipal and Junta Recepcion (polling station) levels. These three levels of boards were created to decentralize control of the process in order to guarantee the fairness of elections.
Voting in Guatemala is always on a Sunday.
Voting Stations—which may have up to 100 voting tables—were to open officially at 7:00 am. Voting stations are to close at 6:00 pm. However, electoral boards in each department have the power to determine the closing time based on factors such as weather, the number of people waiting to vote or any circumstances that impede the electoral process. Polling hours are particularly important in areas where some voters have to travel many hours to vote.
The stations are always enclosed, with a gate that can be shut and locked. Anyone not inside the gate at closing time cannot vote. All voters inside the polling station by the time the gates are closed can vote. When the president of a table declares that a table is closed, all those standing in line at the time must have the opportunity to vote.
At each polling station there are a number of officials: a single coordinator for the whole station, with several deputies; a president, a secretary, a vocal (member-at-large), and an alguacil, or sergeant-at-arms, for each table.
In addition, all political parties have the right to have one fiscal, or scrutineer, at each voting table. Fiscales are present to ensure fair treatment for their party during the entire balloting process. This means they will be present at the polling station from 5:30 am when the officials arrive to prepare their stations and tables to the end of the count late at night. Fiscales can challenge the validity of ballots during the count, and they receive an official copy of their table’s vote counts for each position after the count has been completed.
Table officials receive sealed boxes that contain the 600 ballots for each position, ballot bags and the voter registration list for that table. Also provided are supplies such as signs, a calculator, felt pens, rubber stamps, ink pads and ink, rolls of toilet paper, tape, forms or documents for opening and closing the table, a numbered list to count voters, clear plastic ballot bags, and envelopes in which to seal the different used and unused ballots at the completion of the count.
Every ballot must be counted, then stamped and initialed by the table president. At the closing of the polls, every unused ballot must be counted and stamped “unused.”
Each registered voter has a voting identity card or booklet called a cedula. Voters must vote in the municipality and voting station listed on their cedula. If a voter has moved away from their community they can register to vote where they are working and living. However, if a voter votes outside of his or her municipality of residence, they can only vote for the national offices of president and congress.
Each voter is assigned a unique registration number. Voters have to vote at a specific voting station and table. Each voting table is assigned a list of no more than 600 voters.
Guatemala does not permit voting by proxy.
A voter’s cedula and registration confirmation is checked against the voter registration list. This information must correspond to the information on the voter registration list in order for the voter to receive their ballots. The president of the voting table keeps the cedula until the voter has deposited their ballots.
In this election there were five ballots to be marked: white for president and vice-president, green for national congress, blue for district congress, pink for municipal representatives, and grey for the Central American Parliament.
The voter takes five ballots to a voting booth, and marks each ballot with an ‘X’ in the square over the party’s logo. They then place their ballots in corresponding clear plastic ballot bags through labeled slots in the tabletop. They retrieve their cedula, sign the voter registration list (or place their thumbprint next to their name), and dip one finger in ink. The ink stain indicates that the person has voted and prevents the same person voting more than once.
At the end of voting day, the face of unused ballots at each table are stamped ‘unused,’ counted, and reconciled with the count of the used ballots and the number of signatures and thumbprints on the voters list.
Each polling station—in the capital city at least—has a computer counting station with modem access to a telephone line. Once the ballots have been counted and the paperwork filled out for each table, an official delivers the forms to the computer station for transmission to the national vote tabulation center (at the Hyatt Hotel in Guatemala City for this election).
Polling stations that do not have computers must fax the results in at the end of the night.
The final vote count is carried out at the TSE national counting center and is presided over by the magistrates and officers of the TSE.
[1]
National Geographic, June 1988, vol.173, no.6
pp.768-803; Lonely Planet Destination Guatemala web page
lonelyplanet.com.au/dest/cam/gua.htm; Guatemala en Cifras-Alianza Nueva
Nacion web page urng.com/pdg5.html
[2] Colom's uncle, social democrat Manuel Colom Argueta, was assassinated in 1979.
[3]
MINUGUA Report No.3 on Electoral Activities September 1-13, 1999)
[4] Prensa Libre December 27th
